Review of “Historical Ontology” by Dharamsi, Karim
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 5
Issue 2 Animal Ethics Article 9
6-2004
Review of “Historical Ontology”
Karim Dharamsi
University of Winnipeg
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Dharamsi, Karim (2004) "Review of “Historical Ontology”," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/dharamsi1rev.html[9/18/2009 5:06:44 PM]
Essays in Philosophy
A Biannual Journal
Vol. 5 No. 2, June 2004
Book Review
Historical Ontology, Ian Hacking. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. pp. 279.
Hardcover, $41.00. ISBN 0-674-00616-X.
Ian Hacking’s Historical Ontology is a collection of “occasional” papers given over the past three
decades. The papers demonstrate Hacking’s astounding versatility, his erudition and his conspicuous
place amongst analytical philosophers working today; not only is Hacking at home discussing technical
matters friendly to philosophers of science, but he can also speak the language of the continental
philosopher while domesticating that language for an analytical audience. Historical Ontology is also a
contribution to the philosophy of history: an area of philosophy that today remains largely neglected both
professionally and in academic programmes of philosophy. Of course, the release of this text is timely
and it may speak to a general change in philosophical attitude amongst the highest ranking in the
profession; Bernard Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness and Frank Farrell’s Subjectivity, Realism and
Postmodernism, both noteworthy recent responses to Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature, are worth mentioning if only for their having revitalised debates around history and its
relationship to philosophical understanding.
Historical Ontology is an excellent collection of fifteen essays, and while it is, in part, (as I claim) a
work in the philosophy of history, it is neither genealogical in its treatment of philosophical matters
nor are the essays especially historicist when read in isolation from Hacking’s underlying thematic.
I return to this point shortly. The collection does appear, by way of the table of contents, to be
disconnected. The essays are topically wide ranging and, for those familiar with Hacking’s other
work, are carried by an approachable and systematic style. Included are essays on self-improvement,
philology and style for historians and philosophers. Three papers especially stand out, in my view:
“Leibniz and Descartes: Proof and Eternal Truths,” “Wittgenstein as Philosophical Psychologist,”
and “How, Why, When and Where Did Language Go Public?” These papers expose Hacking’s
original contribution to the study of the history of philosophy and his ability to read carefully and
critically. For the interested scholar, compelling arguments are presented; for the undergraduate or
graduate student they are wonderfully instructive papers, and many are worthy of systematic
response. The essays can be read individually, but this may, I gently suggest, underdetermine
Hacking’s aim.
What makes this collection especially interesting is the Foucault-inspired theme that Hacking claims
“looms in the background.” It is this imminent thematic compass that I wish to comment on for the
remainder of this review.
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Hacking’s choice of “historical ontology” is quite deliberate; the book’s first sentence introduces the
title’s “self-importance.” Hacking claims to have “always disliked the word ‘ontology’.” Of course,
we might take it to be a “study of being” but Hacking rightly points out the difficulties involved in
giving an account of such a study. He writes:
If, like myself, you can understand the aims of psychology, cosmology, and theology, but are
hard pressed to explain what a study of being in general might be, you can hardly welcome
talk of ontology. In the twentieth century the word attracted significant philosophers such as
W.V. Quine and Martin Heidegger, but their pronouncements on the subject were sometimes
bizarre as well as profound. Think of Quine’s ontological aphorism, “To be is to be the value
of a variable.” (1)
In spite of Hacking’s deep reservations about the term “ontology,” he resolves to stipulate a
relatively uncontroversial definition:
… suppose we want to talk in quite a general way about all types of objects, and what makes
it possible for them to come into being. It is convenient to group them together by talking
about “what there is,” or ontology. (1)
Hacking points out that historically philosophers have emphasised “demarcation,” in their concerns
about ontology; they have wondered where to draw their boundaries in deciding on what candidates
for existence to include. Hacking circumvents those sorts of disputes. Rather, he tells us that he is a
“dynamic nominalist.” In Hacking’s words, he is “interested in how our practices of naming
interact with the things that we name … [but also he] could be called a dialectical realist,
preoccupied by the interactions between what there is (and what comes into being) and our
conceptions of it” (emphasis mine. 2). There is a tenuous relationship between this sort of
nominalism and realism, but we can leave out any substantive appraisal in this brief discussion.
Still, one might wonder at what sort of commitment we might understand ourselves to be making to
an object or class or whatever it is we individuate when it is only in its individuation that we can
properly think of it as existing? What sort of “interaction” is there between what is individuated and
what is conceived? Is not this merely a matter of a conceptual relation? Hacking’s responses are
interesting.
Hacking dovetails, as his title suggests, an understanding of history with ontology. Our worries
about the individuation of an object, if explained by way of our concerns about ontology, involves,
it seems, giving an account of how that object came to be individuated. In other words, introducing
an object into our practices of naming objects of that particular kind can be given an account, but
what sort of account might we be in need of? Hacking observes that our interest is in the object’s
“coming into being” and what might this be if not an historical account? He is careful to quarantine
criticisms that might charge him with constructivism. Instead, Hacking’s historical ontology takes
the historically imminent categories of the social sciences as “presenting themselves as positive
knowledge, the bearers of general facts and testable truths about the human condition” (24). Any
given category in the social sciences may alter our understanding of “social reality,” but in its role
in making such a change possible, the category is no less real than those individuated existents that
seem to resist the individuating practices prone to theory-oriented flux.
It is from Michel Foucault’s (1984) “What is Enlightenment?” that Hacking borrows the idea of an
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historical ontology. In Hacking’s hands such an ontology speaks, in one of its aspects, to how
“various concepts, practices, and corresponding institutions … disclose new possibilities for human
choice and action..." (4). Hacking fashions this idea around his historical ontology; namely, an
ontology “concerned with objects or their effects which do not exist in any recognizable form until
they are objects of scientific study” (11). By linking our concerns with our scientific practices,
Hacking is making a bold claim: there are “styles of reasoning” which force our powers of
discrimination to illuminate certain aspects of reality; a tribunal that can then adjudicate candidates
for truth and falsity does so only in its own jurisdiction. Hacking says of truths under a certain
jurisdiction, “styles of reasoning,” that they are “curiously immune to anything akin to refutation”
(192). It is in a future work that Hacking will fill-out this position.
Overall, Historical Ontology is worth our time and our effort. Hacking’s insights into the practices
of philosophers and the place of history in those practices is not only significant, but as I suggested
at the start of this review, timely. While many of Hacking’s main insights are left unattended, we
are treated to brilliant essays and a promise of more to come. I highly recommend this title.
Karim Dharamsi
University of Winnipeg
_______________________________________________________________
Copyright ã 2004, Humboldt State University
